Twitter chat, 4/16/14
Apr. 17th, 2014 12:41 pm![[personal profile]](https://www.dreamwidth.org/img/silk/identity/user.png){kind=small}
endymions_bowerHere's the lovely little "Athena-Neith" again. I want to discuss her a little:
pic.twitter.com/Nk8Gfw0vRS
The image seems to be of Athena as a child, holding an icon of Serapis in her right hand. Let's say, for argument's sake, that albeit not labeled, this is an image of a syncretistic Athena-Neith. What would that mean? From the perspective of polycentric polytheism, we say that all the Gods are in each one. So, there is Neith in Athena, and Athena in Neith. In this image, we may say that we see Athena displaying the Neith in her, or to be playful about it, Athena in Neith-drag.
***
A conversation with Julian Betkowski, @LuxuriantDevice (who blogs at erosiserosiseros.blogspot.com, and whose art is available at society6.com/JulianBetkowski) and with @Roewoof.
@LuxuriantDevice: Are you familiar with Badiou's Being and Event and his reading of set theory in relation to Plato and Aristotle?
Yes, I'm familiar with Badiou. I find his work meaningful, but with some clear limitations. First, and here I'm piggybacking on Zalamea's critique of Badiou, on behalf of a Lautman-esque philosophy of mathematics, it's problematic that Badiou reduces mathematics to set theory, and thus to logic. Highly recommend Zalamea, Synthetic Philosophy of Contemporary Mathematics on this. The other problem I have with Badiou may be related to the former in interesting ways, but in a nutshell it's his dualism.
@LuxuriantDevice: I agree that there's something strange in Badiou's strategy, but is it more problematic that Deleuze's work with the infinitesimal calculus in Difference and Repetition?
Yes, because my problem with Badiou's recourse to mathematics isn't that he's a dabbler, it's the position of mathematics relative to philosophy. In Badiou, we have in effect a domain of ontological closure, sealed by mathematics, and a domain of freedom. Now, Badiou's logicism with respect to mathematics is very much in the mainstream of philosophy of mathematics, which grounds itself in set theory. But in Zalamea, who grounds himself in Lautman, as Deleuze also did, we have the reverse, with logic actually being derived from mathematics, a position which I feel is closer to Platonism in spirit. Here's the global point: rather than positing ontology as the domain of closure, a problematic/synthetic mathematics embodies ontological freedom itself.
(Look at me, the arch-Deleuzean this morning.)
@LuxuriantDevice: Understood! I have anxieties about linking linguistic structures of description to logic at an ontological level.
Well, you'll like Zalamea. I believe he regards logic as a subdiscipline of geometry. The thing with the synthetic mathematics approach is it positions itself at the cutting edge, so the math is impossible, whereas set theory basically only deals with elementary mathematics, which makes it easier in principle to grasp. A synthetic philosophy of mathematics is, in effect, a moving target, and so ontology itself is not static.
***
In the "Athena-Neith" icon, it's interesting that Athena holds Serapis much as she might hold a small Nike. Here, I see Athena embracing the whole eclectic Graeco-Egyptian synthesis as an organic development of the Olympian project. Athena presents Serapis as a portal between the Hellenic and Egyptian theologies. Recognizing Gods as individuals, we no longer see pantheons as sealed. Hence there is no tension between so-called "hard" polytheism and eclecticism. On the contrary, to see Gods as dependent parts of their pantheons is to say that only the pantheon is a true unit.
The art or knack of polytheism lies in attributing the proper weight to pantheons. A pantheon is a group of deities involved in a most intimate way with one another, linked by bonds of eros and will.
@Roewoof: This is how I approach polytheism. I am very aware and strict about being familiar with traditions and pantheons. I don't blend the gods with others who serve similar purpose in other pantheons, BUT, I recognize that many can speak to an individual even if said individual is heavily involved with another pantheon.
Yes, precisely. Because the Gods are individuals, one can be called to them individually, too.
@Roewoof: I'm annoyed by those who don't bother to educate themselves, and those who claim that you can't worship outside of a pantheon.
Exactly; these are the alternatives to be avoided.
@Roewoof: They're two very shitty extremes in my opinion. Being implicitly eclectic is a good medium.
Gods have always come to me one by one. Sometimes they bring along others from their pantheon, sometimes not, or not so far.
@LuxuriantDevice: If a pantheon is understood as a family grouping, this doesn't preclude the formation of other divine bonds across pantheons.
And this is just what we see in antiquity. The key is to recognize the full diversity of relations that can exist between deities. Polytheism is the theology of relation. There are the bonds within a pantheon, expressed by kinship relations and the reciprocal relations of mythic narrative, and there are the bonds of common functions, which are simply common dispositions toward the cosmos.
So when one begins to worship a certain deity, they can "bring along" deities related along either of these axes. They can bring along deities with whom they have a pantheon relationship (spouse, child, et al.), or they can bring along deities from a different pantheon with similar patterns of activity. Or, the activity patterns may not be similar, but harmonious, compatible, such as to complement an aspect of their own work.
@LuxuriantDevice: I would suggest than an understanding of the Other(s) is foundational for a polytheistic theology.
Do you mean the sense of alterity generally (i.e., the irreducible singularity and "peculiarity" of a deity)?
@LuxuriantDevice: Yes, though I would extend that sense to being in general and not merely divine beings; the sense of alterity should already be established in mundane existence before it can effectively migrate to the divine. I suggest that this is a move that is particularly difficult for the average modern American religious mindset. When God is understood as a justification for order (social/political/natural…) alterity is dissolved into homogeneity.
Platonists say particulars below infima species are analogous to the individuals prior to form (the henads or Gods). This is on account of the axiom that higher principles have wider causality, hence beings inferior to form manifest the causality of principles prior to form. The peculiar, the unique: this is the nature of divinity for Platonists. The formal, the common, emerges from peculiarity in the absolute sense, though it is not robbed of value by this. Rather, the common derives its value from being the will and the work of the Gods, rather than undermining them as something prior to them, something which would merely fail to ground itself.
There are two degrees of the Common produced by the Gods: that produced in a pantheon, and that which is prior. What is produced in the pantheon is intellective in the narrow sense, and is generated by all the actions in myths. This is the Common generated by groups of deities acting reciprocally upon one another, in the limits of a mythic space. Such a space is, in Platonic jargon, intelligible-intellective (or noetico-noeric). Such a space is not "limited" in the sense that it fails to encompass all things.
But there is another Common, which is emptily formal, where the other is rich in content. This Common arises from the most basic attributes of any henad as such, without distinction, a very minimal set of determinations. These determinations are still activities of the Gods, they are not prior to them, but express rather two levels of intellect. The intra-pantheon Common expresses intellective intellect, the pre-pantheon Common the intelligible intellect.
One of the things I've explored in the new article on Damascius is the prospect of two different modes of philosophy corresponding to these two degrees of the Common.
@LuxuriantDevice: Perhaps Gods, and beings in general, may constitute order, but order does not necessarily derive from their being itself; or order is not justified by the existence of divinity, but circumscribed in it: the Gods define order through an act of will, not through the passivity of simply being. Maybe this isn't actually a step forward, though: Divine imperative justifies itself in either case.
"Order" has to have two different senses here. That which derives from their being itself is utterly thin, emptily formal, and is thus not implicated in mechanisms of social control with which you are concerned. The second sense of "order" has to do with ordinances, customs, mores arising within a particular culture. These have to do with the inner-pantheon activities of the Gods, which demand a hermeneutic. I have argued that the necessity for a hermeneutic of the inner-pantheon activities (myths) derives from the fact that the Gods in them are not merely the parts in these wholes. There is an analogy here for the citizen; this is the key to my argument in my article on the Republic, "Esoteric City". The God in his mythic narrative, the citizen in his state: the problems are formally analogous.
pic.twitter.com/Nk8Gfw0vRS
The image seems to be of Athena as a child, holding an icon of Serapis in her right hand. Let's say, for argument's sake, that albeit not labeled, this is an image of a syncretistic Athena-Neith. What would that mean? From the perspective of polycentric polytheism, we say that all the Gods are in each one. So, there is Neith in Athena, and Athena in Neith. In this image, we may say that we see Athena displaying the Neith in her, or to be playful about it, Athena in Neith-drag.
***
A conversation with Julian Betkowski, @LuxuriantDevice (who blogs at erosiserosiseros.blogspot.com, and whose art is available at society6.com/JulianBetkowski) and with @Roewoof.
@LuxuriantDevice: Are you familiar with Badiou's Being and Event and his reading of set theory in relation to Plato and Aristotle?
Yes, I'm familiar with Badiou. I find his work meaningful, but with some clear limitations. First, and here I'm piggybacking on Zalamea's critique of Badiou, on behalf of a Lautman-esque philosophy of mathematics, it's problematic that Badiou reduces mathematics to set theory, and thus to logic. Highly recommend Zalamea, Synthetic Philosophy of Contemporary Mathematics on this. The other problem I have with Badiou may be related to the former in interesting ways, but in a nutshell it's his dualism.
@LuxuriantDevice: I agree that there's something strange in Badiou's strategy, but is it more problematic that Deleuze's work with the infinitesimal calculus in Difference and Repetition?
Yes, because my problem with Badiou's recourse to mathematics isn't that he's a dabbler, it's the position of mathematics relative to philosophy. In Badiou, we have in effect a domain of ontological closure, sealed by mathematics, and a domain of freedom. Now, Badiou's logicism with respect to mathematics is very much in the mainstream of philosophy of mathematics, which grounds itself in set theory. But in Zalamea, who grounds himself in Lautman, as Deleuze also did, we have the reverse, with logic actually being derived from mathematics, a position which I feel is closer to Platonism in spirit. Here's the global point: rather than positing ontology as the domain of closure, a problematic/synthetic mathematics embodies ontological freedom itself.
(Look at me, the arch-Deleuzean this morning.)
@LuxuriantDevice: Understood! I have anxieties about linking linguistic structures of description to logic at an ontological level.
Well, you'll like Zalamea. I believe he regards logic as a subdiscipline of geometry. The thing with the synthetic mathematics approach is it positions itself at the cutting edge, so the math is impossible, whereas set theory basically only deals with elementary mathematics, which makes it easier in principle to grasp. A synthetic philosophy of mathematics is, in effect, a moving target, and so ontology itself is not static.
***
In the "Athena-Neith" icon, it's interesting that Athena holds Serapis much as she might hold a small Nike. Here, I see Athena embracing the whole eclectic Graeco-Egyptian synthesis as an organic development of the Olympian project. Athena presents Serapis as a portal between the Hellenic and Egyptian theologies. Recognizing Gods as individuals, we no longer see pantheons as sealed. Hence there is no tension between so-called "hard" polytheism and eclecticism. On the contrary, to see Gods as dependent parts of their pantheons is to say that only the pantheon is a true unit.
The art or knack of polytheism lies in attributing the proper weight to pantheons. A pantheon is a group of deities involved in a most intimate way with one another, linked by bonds of eros and will.
@Roewoof: This is how I approach polytheism. I am very aware and strict about being familiar with traditions and pantheons. I don't blend the gods with others who serve similar purpose in other pantheons, BUT, I recognize that many can speak to an individual even if said individual is heavily involved with another pantheon.
Yes, precisely. Because the Gods are individuals, one can be called to them individually, too.
@Roewoof: I'm annoyed by those who don't bother to educate themselves, and those who claim that you can't worship outside of a pantheon.
Exactly; these are the alternatives to be avoided.
@Roewoof: They're two very shitty extremes in my opinion. Being implicitly eclectic is a good medium.
Gods have always come to me one by one. Sometimes they bring along others from their pantheon, sometimes not, or not so far.
@LuxuriantDevice: If a pantheon is understood as a family grouping, this doesn't preclude the formation of other divine bonds across pantheons.
And this is just what we see in antiquity. The key is to recognize the full diversity of relations that can exist between deities. Polytheism is the theology of relation. There are the bonds within a pantheon, expressed by kinship relations and the reciprocal relations of mythic narrative, and there are the bonds of common functions, which are simply common dispositions toward the cosmos.
So when one begins to worship a certain deity, they can "bring along" deities related along either of these axes. They can bring along deities with whom they have a pantheon relationship (spouse, child, et al.), or they can bring along deities from a different pantheon with similar patterns of activity. Or, the activity patterns may not be similar, but harmonious, compatible, such as to complement an aspect of their own work.
@LuxuriantDevice: I would suggest than an understanding of the Other(s) is foundational for a polytheistic theology.
Do you mean the sense of alterity generally (i.e., the irreducible singularity and "peculiarity" of a deity)?
@LuxuriantDevice: Yes, though I would extend that sense to being in general and not merely divine beings; the sense of alterity should already be established in mundane existence before it can effectively migrate to the divine. I suggest that this is a move that is particularly difficult for the average modern American religious mindset. When God is understood as a justification for order (social/political/natural…) alterity is dissolved into homogeneity.
Platonists say particulars below infima species are analogous to the individuals prior to form (the henads or Gods). This is on account of the axiom that higher principles have wider causality, hence beings inferior to form manifest the causality of principles prior to form. The peculiar, the unique: this is the nature of divinity for Platonists. The formal, the common, emerges from peculiarity in the absolute sense, though it is not robbed of value by this. Rather, the common derives its value from being the will and the work of the Gods, rather than undermining them as something prior to them, something which would merely fail to ground itself.
There are two degrees of the Common produced by the Gods: that produced in a pantheon, and that which is prior. What is produced in the pantheon is intellective in the narrow sense, and is generated by all the actions in myths. This is the Common generated by groups of deities acting reciprocally upon one another, in the limits of a mythic space. Such a space is, in Platonic jargon, intelligible-intellective (or noetico-noeric). Such a space is not "limited" in the sense that it fails to encompass all things.
But there is another Common, which is emptily formal, where the other is rich in content. This Common arises from the most basic attributes of any henad as such, without distinction, a very minimal set of determinations. These determinations are still activities of the Gods, they are not prior to them, but express rather two levels of intellect. The intra-pantheon Common expresses intellective intellect, the pre-pantheon Common the intelligible intellect.
One of the things I've explored in the new article on Damascius is the prospect of two different modes of philosophy corresponding to these two degrees of the Common.
@LuxuriantDevice: Perhaps Gods, and beings in general, may constitute order, but order does not necessarily derive from their being itself; or order is not justified by the existence of divinity, but circumscribed in it: the Gods define order through an act of will, not through the passivity of simply being. Maybe this isn't actually a step forward, though: Divine imperative justifies itself in either case.
"Order" has to have two different senses here. That which derives from their being itself is utterly thin, emptily formal, and is thus not implicated in mechanisms of social control with which you are concerned. The second sense of "order" has to do with ordinances, customs, mores arising within a particular culture. These have to do with the inner-pantheon activities of the Gods, which demand a hermeneutic. I have argued that the necessity for a hermeneutic of the inner-pantheon activities (myths) derives from the fact that the Gods in them are not merely the parts in these wholes. There is an analogy here for the citizen; this is the key to my argument in my article on the Republic, "Esoteric City". The God in his mythic narrative, the citizen in his state: the problems are formally analogous.
