![[personal profile]](https://www.dreamwidth.org/img/silk/identity/user.png){kind=small}
endymions_bower) wrote2019-11-23 11:17 am
Aristotle and the Gods
"The affection of children for their parents, like that of humans for the Gods, is the affection for what is good, and superior to oneself, for they have bestowed on them the greatest benefits in being the cause of their existence and rearing, and later of their education," (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1162a4-7).
"We understand the Gods to enjoy supreme felicity and happiness. But what sort of actions can we attribute to them? … If we go through the list we shall find that all forms of virtuous conduct seem trifling and unworthy of the Gods … But for a living being, if we eliminate action, and a fortiori production, what remains save contemplation? It follows that the God's activity, which is transcendent in blessedness, is the activity of contemplation; and therefore among human activities, that which is most akin to the divine activity of contemplation will be the greatest source of happiness." (Nicomachean Ethics, 1178b7-24).
Such passages are good examples of how the Gods feature in Aristotle's thought. They are never the objects of his deduction; rather, he reasons from what he takes to be uncontroversial premises concerning Them. Another example is the discussion from the Politics (1332b17-27) of whether there is a natural ruling class. A crucial stage in his argument is that we do not observe between any classes of humans the difference we believe to exist between humans and "the Gods and heroes". The Gods and heroes, he stipulates, possess "a great superiority in regard to the body and the soul" over humans, which makes "the pre-eminence of the rulers" in their case "indisputable and manifest to the subjects." But this is not the case with respect to human rulers.
Bodéüs offers an example in which the change of one letter by modern editors changes the logical structure of Aristotle's argument, turning a reference to the Gods into a conclusion, rather than a premise. At Metaphysics 1072b28-9, the typical translation reads "We hold, then, that God is a living being, eternal, and most good." Now, the first thing we ought to do is to restore the definite article in front of "God", because we are speaking generically of "the God" (τὸν θεὸν). But there's more: "then" here reflects an emendation in the text, which in the manuscripts says φαμέν δὲ, so that it reads instead φαμέν δή, changing the phrase from something like "We say, besides," i.e., as part of a series of premises, to something like "We conclude". In the manuscripts, then, Aristotle is treating as a commonplace that the Gods in general are eternal living things who are ἄριστον, the finest of things. The change from the manuscripts is subtle, but together with modern translators' habitual dropping of the article in front of θεός, helps to fix in the reader's mind that Aristotle, in Book Lambda of the Metaphysics, is promulgating a new theology about a new, singular "God".
Aristotle states that even if elements of the mythic tradition have been added over time "for expediency", there is a core doctrine, handed down from the remotest antiquity, which he holds to be "divinely spoken". This core doctrine is that "the primary substances are Gods," which includes the celestial bodies, but is not limited to them, for "the divine encompasses the whole of nature." (Metaphysics 1074b1-10). We see also from De Caelo (279a18-22) that the total number of Gods is not tied for him to calculations concerning the unmoved movers behind celestial motion, because Aristotle speaks there of an indeterminate multiplicity of "things beyond the heaven": "The things there [outside the heaven] are of such a nature as not to occupy any place, nor does time age them … they continue throughout their entire duration [aiôn] unaltered and unmodified, living the best and most self-sufficient of lives." As such, the doctrine concerning unmoved movers, while it allows one to determine the existence of certain divine entities purely from the demands of physics, is not intended by Aristotle to delimit the entire extension of divine being. (Note that it is difficult to render faithfully the phrase here translated "their entire duration" (ton hapanta aiôna), inasmuch as Aristotle goes on to explain (279a18&sqq.) that the "duration" in question is all time when we are speaking of divine things.)
"The activity [energeia] of a God is immortality, that is, eternal life." (Aristotle, De Caelo ii 3, 286a9-10). The beautiful thing about this quote is that we see that the Gods have for him no narrowly circumscribed functions, nor some telos extrinsic to Them.
Here's another one blowing a hole in the received interpretation of Aristotle: his reference at NE 1141b1-2 to "things far more divine in their nature than humans," of which "the most visible" are the celestial bodies—proving that Aristotle recognizes other Gods than these. In this regard, Aristotle shows himself to be exactly in line with Plato, who distinguishes between "the Gods who revolve manifestly," i.e., the celestial bodies, and "the Gods who manifest Themselves so far as They choose," e.g., the Olympians (Timaeus 41a). Indeed, it is an awkward problem for proponents of an "astral theology" in Plato and Aristotle, that both agree it is a primitive stage of religion to acknowledge only the visible Gods, and not yet those who manifest "when They choose" (see, e.g., Cratylus 397c-d). (The affirmation by these philosophers of the Gods manifesting "when They choose" will also be news to people who think it anachronistic to attribute to the ancients a notion of personal divine gnôsis.)
Another aspect of Aristotle's thought which is inconvenient for the received interpretation is his belief in heroes. For he believes that virtue exists "on a heroic or divine scale", so that, "as is said, surpassing virtue changes humans into Gods," (NE 1145a20-5). Indeed, one will sometimes hear of a prosecution against Aristotle for impiety—which wasn't on account of his doubting the Gods, but rather for an ode in which he appeared to recognize a deceased friend as a hero. So, Aristotle believed in too many, rather than too few Gods! Aristotle also refers to the "age of heroes" (Pol. 1285b) and in the Problemata (953a13-16) to the "age of Herakles". Indeed, Bodéüs (pp. 91-2) cites a number of Aristotle's references to Herakles, all of which indicate a belief in Him as having been something more than human.
"First among the claims of righteousness are our duties to the Gods, then our duties to the spirits, then those to country and parents, then those to the departed." (Aristotle, On Virtues and Vices, 1250b20-22); see also ibid., 1251a31-32: "Transgression in regard to Gods and spirits, or even in regard to the departed and to parents and country, is impiety."
"The good that is ours by nature clearly does not depend upon us, but comes from certain divine causes to beings that are truly fortunate." (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1179b21-23)
Q: I came across Wolfson's article “Plurality of Immovable Movers in Aristotle and Averroës”. Is this article reliable ? Wolfson seemingly takes Aristotle to argue that while there are multiple Unmoved Movers, there is only one Unmoved Mover not subject to “accidental change”. Quoting Wolfson (pp. 242-243), "…Aristotle assumes one first immovable mover, that is, the mover of the sphere of the fixed stars, and it is this immovable mover which he describes as the first, but besides this first immovable mover, he assumes also other immovable movers, that is, the movers of the planetary spheres, which he does not describe as first. The first mover is one and unique, because it alone is immovable even accidentally and it alone produces only one kind of motion. The manyness of the movers of the planetary spheres consists in their each producing a different kind of motion in a different sphere. This manyness Aristotle would describe as a manyness in species or in formula or in definition, and is a manyness which does not involve matter." Per Wolfson, seems that the unique Mover is first among almost-equals? Is his reading of Aristotle correct?
I wanted to wait to reply until I'd had a chance to read Wolfson's article. I agree with his general approach, which seeks to harmonize what Aristotle says in different texts, rather than resorting to constant hypotheses about "interpolation" à la Jaeger. I also agree with Merlan (cited on p. 243), who contends that the relationship between the movers, given what we know, would likely be somewhat like the relationship between numbers, but I think that we lack the resources from Aristotle to settle the question conclusively.
The question highlights, though, something which I see as perhaps the crucial difference between Plato (and the Academic Platonists after him) and Aristotle, namely that the Platonists conceive of numerical difference prior to form. This is the ultimate significance of the Platonic doctrine of so-called "ideal numbers", which is obscured for us by conceiving it as a kind of numerology. To the degree that something like this is a consequence of the doctrine, I see it as of only minor philosophical import.
What matters, rather, about placing "the One" and "number" prior to form is that there is a principle of individuation and of multiplicity prior to that according to form (or "species"). This is precisely where the later Platonic doctrine respecting "henads" and "monads" comes in, and we cannot say with certainty how early it arose in the Academy, given the paucity of surviving texts from early figures like Speusippus and Xenocrates.
To return, then, to Aristotle's unmoved movers, if indeed the working out of this doctrine required tackling the problem of incorporeal individuation in a manner different from how the Platonists had dealt with it, I am not sure Aristotle gives us a complete solution. It might provide an elegant rationale, however, for the placement of books M & N of the Metaphysics, with their critique of Platonic number doctrine, after Lambda with its consideration of the unmoved movers, albeit M & N do not seem to settle the question.
Before leaving off, however, I would like to stress again, in the context of the original discussion, that in my view Aristotle never intended his doctrine of unmoved movers to be a "theology" in the sense monotheists have made it. The inquiry into the unmoved movers is "theological" for Aristotle just insofar as it investigates beings which share in some of the traits traditionally accorded to the Gods. As Bodéüs aptly points out, Aristotle thus terms it θεολογική, but not θεολόγια. I can only think that Aristotle would find it bizarre that he is read today to argue for displacing the Gods by a system of unmoved movers exercising no providence. Were this truly his view, he never states it, and it conflicts with what he does say whenever he mentions the Gods.
"Whatever choice and possession of natural goods … is best able to produce the spectacle of the God is the best choice … The choice that, either through deficiency or excess, hinders the worship of the God and his spectacle is a bad one." (Aristotle, Eudemian Ethics 1249b16-21)
Bodéüs makes a compelling case for translating θεωρίαν here as "spectacle", in accord with Plato's usage at Laws 649e, where it refers to the festival of Dionysos. Aristotle thus uses the festal appearance of the God as a metaphor for theophany in general. If we remember the Platonic and Aristotelian doctrine of the Gods showing Themselves when and to whom They wish, the idea here is obvious: we must make ourselves worthy of such theophany.
"For the God is not a ruler in the sense of issuing commands, but is that for the sake of which wisdom gives commands," (Aristotle, Eudemian Ethics, 1249b15-16). What sort of commands will wisdom issue for the sake of the Gods? Whatever will maximize the worship of Them and the opportunities for the “spectacle” of Them (theophany), as in the passage I quoted previously from the Eudemian Ethics, which follows immediately upon this one (1249b16-21).
On Friendship Between Humans and Gods
"Friendship exacts what is possible, not what is due; requital in accordance with desert is in fact sometimes impossible, for instance in honoring the Gods, or one's parents: no one could ever render them the honor they deserve, and a man is deemed virtuous if he pays them all the regard that he can." (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1163b)
“When a wide disparity arises between two friends in point of virtue or vice, or of wealth, or anything else, they no longer remain nor indeed expect to remain friends. This is most manifest in the case of the Gods, whose superiority in every good attribute is pre-eminent … This gives rise to the question, is it not after all untrue that we wish our friends the greatest of goods? For instance, can we wish them to become Gods? For then they will lose us as friends, and therefore lose certain goods, for friends are goods.” (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1158b-1159a)
“It seems likely that the person who pursues intellectual activity, and who cultivates their intellect and keeps it in the best condition, is also most beloved of the Gods. For if, as is generally believed, the Gods exercise some superintendence over human affairs, then it will be reasonable to suppose that They take pleasure in that part of the human which is best and most akin to Themselves, namely the intellect, and that They recompense with Their favors those who esteem and honor this most, because these care for the things dear to Themselves, and act rightly and nobly. Now it is clear that all these attributes belong most of all to the wise. They therefore are most beloved by the Gods; and if so, they are naturally most happy.” (Aristotle, NE 1179a)
“The friendship [philia] of father and son is the same as that between a God and a human and between benefactor and beneficiary, and generally between natural ruler and natural subject.” (Aristotle, Eudemian Ethics 1242a)
“Even the God and the good person are capable of doing bad deeds, but they are not of that character; for the wicked are always so called because of their deliberate choice of evil. Furthermore, a capacity is always among the things worthy of choice, for even capacities for evil are worthy of choice; and so we say that the God and the good person possess them, for we say that they are capable of doing evil.” (Aristotle, Topics 126a35-126b1)
Q: So he is saying that the God and the good person are able to choose to do evil but don't. Am I understanding that correctly?
Right. For Aristotle, being good doesn't mean being incapable of doing evil, but rather choosing not to. Being good for him is rather the wise use of the power one has. Similarly, Aristotle will say, e.g., that being a physician entails knowing not only how to heal, but also how to harm. That doesn't mean that the physician will do harm, but they would be lacking in knowledge if they did not know how. The importance of this quote is that it shows that for Aristotle the Gods are intelligent agents like us, only lacking our limitations. They are not, in other words, mere forces like magnetism, which always do the same thing and can do no different. Again, if we think of the physician, contrast her as an agent with a medicine she might prescribe. The medicine has effects, but no agency or choice; the God is like the physician, not the medicine.