(no subject)
Mar. 2nd, 2007 12:34 pmAnother charming rejection, this time from Classical Bulletin, for "The Gods and Being in Proclus." The editor said:
Both readers recommended against publication. They had similar, brief reports---they agree on these points:
1) the paper is too insubstantial;
2) the topic is not covered completely;
3) the paper does not consider all the relevant secondary literature.
What's really irritating is that I was supposed to have been informed of this last September, whether by e-mail or post I'm not sure, but somehow I never received it. The editor sent me this after I inquired what had become of the article. I'll also just say for the record that (1) the article in question is, if anything, overly dense, and to call it insubstantial is absurd; (2) if I treated the topic any more "completely," fair reader(s), I doubt you would read it; and (3) I am getting very tired indeed of reviewers who don't care about what a paper says, just who it cites.
***
On other matters, a recent discussion online has brought up a pet peeve of mine, namely the way in which the term "monism" gets brought up in theological discussions and which raises my philosophical hackles.
(From the OED)
monism, n.
1. Any theory, or system of thought or belief, that assumes a single ultimate principle, being, force, etc., rather than more than one.
2. The belief that only one being (or only one kind of being) exists, esp. the doctrine that all living things are elements of a universal being.
3. A theory or doctrine which states that there is a single origin or destination for all the elements or beings within a system, or that there is a single force by which such elements are governed.
Now if, by (1), the single ultimate principle or force is the principle of individuation, if, in other words, by (2), the only kind of beings which exist are individuals, and, by (3), entities are originated by, governed by, and have their telos in that by which they are just the unique individual they are;
THEN, regardless of the example cited under (2), namely, of an organic unity, there is no reason why one may not be a "monist" and a "hard polytheist"; in fact, to be a "hard polytheist" implies monism, because one believes that the individuality and uniqueness of each of the Gods is a primary and radical attribute irreducible to anything else. Now, if one believed that the ultimate constituents of the universe were radically heterogeneous, e.g., "cabbages and kings," that would be a different story. One would be then a pluralist in the proper sense. But it would be very difficult to sustain any pluralism against the sort of monism I have just outlined, which embodies within it a pretty radical pluralism. It is for this very reason, namely its effectiveness in encompassing pluralistic ontologies without distortion, that Platonists adopted it.
Both readers recommended against publication. They had similar, brief reports---they agree on these points:
1) the paper is too insubstantial;
2) the topic is not covered completely;
3) the paper does not consider all the relevant secondary literature.
What's really irritating is that I was supposed to have been informed of this last September, whether by e-mail or post I'm not sure, but somehow I never received it. The editor sent me this after I inquired what had become of the article. I'll also just say for the record that (1) the article in question is, if anything, overly dense, and to call it insubstantial is absurd; (2) if I treated the topic any more "completely," fair reader(s), I doubt you would read it; and (3) I am getting very tired indeed of reviewers who don't care about what a paper says, just who it cites.
***
On other matters, a recent discussion online has brought up a pet peeve of mine, namely the way in which the term "monism" gets brought up in theological discussions and which raises my philosophical hackles.
(From the OED)
monism, n.
1. Any theory, or system of thought or belief, that assumes a single ultimate principle, being, force, etc., rather than more than one.
2. The belief that only one being (or only one kind of being) exists, esp. the doctrine that all living things are elements of a universal being.
3. A theory or doctrine which states that there is a single origin or destination for all the elements or beings within a system, or that there is a single force by which such elements are governed.
Now if, by (1), the single ultimate principle or force is the principle of individuation, if, in other words, by (2), the only kind of beings which exist are individuals, and, by (3), entities are originated by, governed by, and have their telos in that by which they are just the unique individual they are;
THEN, regardless of the example cited under (2), namely, of an organic unity, there is no reason why one may not be a "monist" and a "hard polytheist"; in fact, to be a "hard polytheist" implies monism, because one believes that the individuality and uniqueness of each of the Gods is a primary and radical attribute irreducible to anything else. Now, if one believed that the ultimate constituents of the universe were radically heterogeneous, e.g., "cabbages and kings," that would be a different story. One would be then a pluralist in the proper sense. But it would be very difficult to sustain any pluralism against the sort of monism I have just outlined, which embodies within it a pretty radical pluralism. It is for this very reason, namely its effectiveness in encompassing pluralistic ontologies without distortion, that Platonists adopted it.